Radicals as well as liberals shared the commitment to integration. The political sentiments of the Popular Front were also overwhelmingly integrationist and this is represented in many of the most characteristic products of Popular Front sensibility, such as Earl Robinson's and John LaTouche's "Ballad for Americans" (1939.) (14) Although liberals and radicals differed on many things, and the politics of the late 1940s and early 1950s tended to pull them apart, the need to create a genuinely integrated society was not one of them. If the era If McCarthyism drove a wedge between liberal and radical alternatives on civil rights, by the end of the 1950s there was a new convergence. As the Communist left became increasingly moribund and irrelevant, old leftists with a special commitment for civil rights often joined non-Communist organizations, pushing the liberal civil rights consensus, as Joshua Freeman has demonstrated. (15) By 1960 old sectarian differences were not exactly forgotten, but for those who wished to move on, it was now far easier to do so.
To give an example of this from the history of Rochdale Village, Doxey Wilkerson was one of the most prominent black Communists of the 1940s and 1950s, and contributed an essay, representing the Communist point of view, to the seminal 1944 collection, What the Negro Wants. By the early 1960s his communist days were behind him, and he was teaching at Yeshiva University, with a special interest in promoting integrated education. (16) In 1965 a group supporting integration in Rochdale, one typical of the time in its ideological inclusion, ranging from old leftists to mainstream democrats, arranged for Wilkerson to become a special advisor to the local school district, and he led frequent seminars on how to best implement integrated education in Rochdale. The push for integration in Rochdale and its schools in the early 1960s was marked not by a liberal-left fissure, but a liberal-left collaboration. (17) But the founding act of Rochdale was another sort of collaboration, between one of the city's leading social democratic organizations and an individual who had the reputation for ruthless pragmatism. The developer of Rochdale Village was the United Housing Foundation (UHF) the builder of some 33,000 units of cooperative housing from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s of increasingly gargantuan proportions, culminating in Rochdale Village's younger, larger, and better-known sibling, Co-op City in the Bronx. The UHF was a central organization in New York City's post-war social democratic establishment. (18) The UHF had its roots in the anarchist wing of the Jewish labor movement in the early 20th century. (19) The charismatic president of the UHF, Abraham Kazan was the developer and for many decades manager of the Amalgamated Houses, one of a number of left-wing Jewish housing cooperatives that flourished in the Bronx in the 1920s. His residual anarchist beliefs led him to favor the creation of practical voluntary cooperative endeavors on a non-profit basis that would provide a non-revolutionary alternative to market capitalism. The UHF, founded in 1951, supported its ambitions of building attractive inexpensive housing in the city. (20) Kazan and the UHF always balanced a utopian confidence in a better world in birth with a very nuts and bolts practicality on how to achieve it. Rochdale was named after the Owenite socialists who had started the modern cooperative movement in England in 1844, and the UHF always tried to impart the sense, with some success, that there was something special about living in a cooperative. (21) As for Kazan's business acumen, a brief story--one day, about the time of the building of Rochdale, Kazan was meeting with Gov. Nelson Rockefeller. The governor, impressed with Kazan's savvy, gave him the highest praise a Rockefeller could bestow. He told Kazan that he "could have gone into private business, and made himself a fortune." If Kazan was flattered by Rockefeller's remark, he remained true to his principles. "I am a co-operator," he replied, "interested only in building the cooperative commonwealth." (22) Kazan saw cooperative housing as just the first step towards creating his commonwealth. Rochdale had two cooperative stores, a credit union, a pharmacy, and an optical center, and perhaps most impressively, and despite the determined efforts of Con Edison to prevent it, a cooperatively owned power plant that furnished all gas and electricity to Rochdale. There were unrealized plans for cooperative stores that would sell shoes, furniture, and gasoline, as well as a cooperative barber and beauty shop, bowling alley,and a medical center and hospital. (23) But at the same time, Kazan had hitched the fortunes of his cooperative commonwealth to a man whose name became a byword for ruthless pragmatism, and the bitter scourge of airy idealisms of any kind, Robert Moses. If Kazan and Moses were an unlikely duo, who initially viewed each other with much suspicion, by the mid-1950s Kazan had become in the words of Joel Schwartz, "Moses' favorite redeveloper." (24) Moses found in Kazan a partner his equal in tough-minded resoluteness, who could build attractive housing quickly and inexpensively. Moses and Kazan shared an unswerving commitment to slum clearance and urban renewal, and Kazan, like Moses, did not flinch, when necessary, at tenant removals. For his part, as Kazan's protege, Harold Ostroff asserted, "If you had Moses on your side, you knew that you didn't need anything more than a handshake to know that Moses would be with you through thick and thin." (25) Kazan recalled in his memoirs, "Rochdale Village owes its existence to Robert Moses." (26) This is so. Without Moses's advocacy, and his complete mastery of all of the bureaucratic arts, from threatening, cajoling to begging, Rochdale Village never would have been built.
Rochdale Village was built on the grounds of the Jamaica Race Track, which in the early 1950s was the most popular sporting venue in New York City, drawing 2 million customers annually, more than any of the city's three baseball teams. But the facilities were shabby, transportation was difficult, and there was little room for expansion. The close of Jamaica, with its sale to go to the refurbishing of the state's three other thoroughbred tracks, was rumored from 1953, publicly announced in 1954, and finally happened in 1959, after much dithering and dickering between the interested parties. (27) Needless to say, Moses was one of those interested parties, and as City Construction Coordination he did his best to get his hands on the property from at least 1955 onwards. His initial thoughts for the area included using the site for private houses, for a city housing project, for a mixed use development with public, middle-income, and high income rental housing, a campus for Queensboro Community College, and a new baseball stadium for the increasingly restless Walter O'Malley. Nothing came of any of these suggestions. By October 1956, Moses had decided the best use of the Jamaica site would be a private middle-income housing cooperative, and announced this intention at a speech at the headquarters of the UHF. (28) Moses repeatedly said in the late 1950s that the development of the Jamaica site was his favorite ongoing project, and he gave several reasons for this. Like many city officials of the era, he was very concerned about building affordable middle income housing in the city to staunch the flow to the suburbs, and Rochdale did something about this on the grand scale. He loved the size of the project. As he told a reporter in 1957, it "would be on a big-enough scale so that we could do a bang-up planning and building job there." (29) And most important for Moses, the lot, once the racetrack was razed, would be empty. He told the Times in 1959 that it was his favorite project because, "we have 170 acres there with nothing on it at all. No people to move." (30) By that year political problems and bad press over tenant relocations were mounting for both Moses and his for the UHF. Kazan said of Moses that "the difficulties he had encountered in clearing the Lincoln Center site were still fresh in his mind when he learned that the Jamaica racetrack was going to be given up." (31) But the other reality about the Jamaica site was that if a middle-income cooperative was going to be successful there, it would have to be integrated. It would be welcomed by the neighborhood only if there was complete confidence that blacks could live there freely, and that Rochdale would not cut it itself off from the neighborhood. Local blacks were often suspicious of Rochdale, and black homeowners worried that Rochdale would lead to a decline in real estate values. (32) And at the same time, there was great worry within the UHF and elsewhere that whites would not be interested in moving in large numbers to South Jamaica. This proved to be unwarranted, in part because of the UHF's reputation, and in part because Rochdale proved, as Harold Ostroff wrote in 1968 "that if you offer such an attractive economic buy that people will not be able to afford their natural prejudices." (33) As Kazan told the UHF board in 1960, Rochdale "could attract a more integrated population, [with] more non-white families than have been participating in our previous activities." (34) The UHF and Robert Moses had very different reputations in the area of civil rights. The UHF in the early 1950s was one of only a handful of private developers in the nation who had a rigorously enforced open housing policy in its cooperatives. (35) However, this did not translate into large numbers of blacks in early UHF cooperatives, which remained closely tied to the Jewish labor movement, and had an overwhelmingly Jewish population. Nonetheless, blacks sat on the board of the UHF and its constituent and affiliated cooperatives. (36) Its publications regularly stressed the important role the cooperative movement had to play in ending residential segregation in the North, such as a 1956 article by Eleanor Roosevelt that complained that progress against housing discrimination had been "pitifully slow" and that cooperatives should be in the vanguard of change. With Rochdale Village, the UHF would have its chance (37) On the other hand, Moses had long before Rochdale staked out his reputation as a leading critic of civil rights legislation, and as was typical with Moses, his criticism tended towards the acidulous. He made no secret of his opposition to the landmark 1945 Ives-Quinn antidiscrimination law, which made New York State the first state in the nation to ban discrimination in employment, and in the late 1940s was the most vocal supporter of the right of Metropolitan Life to bar black tenants from its Stuyvesant Town development. (38) In the mid-1950s he was still a critic of civil rights legislation, both in public--telling the New York Post in 1956 that his only regret about his fight to prevent discrimination in publicly financed projects was "that he lost"--and in private, that same year, writing to a city official he blasted a rather bland statement on civil rights from the Mayor's Commission on Intergroup Relations as "contemptible," and as "stimulating racial, ethnic, religious, ideological and economic controversies." (39) Moses was a racial conservative, who feared the extension of civil rights legislations to private home owners and developers. (40) At the same time, Moses was enough of a pragmatist to know which way the wind was blowing, and he had long since made a peace of sorts with civil rights legislation. If he defended the right to discriminate at Stuyvesant Town, as he told the Post in 1956, he thought that Metropolitan Life's decision to exercise that right had been "grievously misinformed" and the attendant political controversy avoidable. He accepted the need to follow state and city anti-discrimination ordinances, and grudgingly acknowledged that the State Commission Against Discrimination (SCAD) had "worked reasonably well," albeit because the "left-wingers" had been kept in check, and the work of SCAD largely remained in the realm moral suasion rather than aggressive enforcement. Moses often worked with developers with special commitments to interracial housing such as the UHF, and on occasion tried to convince recalcitrant developers that fighting an open housing policy would be more trouble than it was worth. (41) In the climate of the late 1950s and early 1960s, Moses didn't hesitate to take credit for his support of integration in Rochdale. In early 1959 he wrote a friendly letter to Elmer Carter, the newly appointed head of SCAD, wanting to set up a meeting. He cautioned Carter that "handsome gestures are no good" in the field of civil rights or open housing legislation. However, he called special attention to the Jamaica project as an example of a valid effort towards integration in housing, and sought Carter's support for the development, which was not yet approved. (42) The UHF had largely financed its previous cooperatives through union pension funds, though not a penny of union money went to the construction of Rochdale Village. The main reason for this was, as Abraham Kazan noted, that powerful union leaders, such as Harry Van Arsdale, president of the New York City Central Labor Council, were "very cool" about the Jamaica project, because he felt that white families would not move to South Jamaica. Kazan himself needed a lot of handholding, and worried that that Rochdale would become, in his words, a "white elephant," with the UHF left holding the bag on unsold apartments, unless the interest rates were suitably low. Moses wrote Gov. Nelson Rockefeller in September 1959, "I had the devil's own time to persuade the labor leaders to agree to sponsor this project." (43) Moses was writing to Rockefeller, after the refusal of both unions and private lenders to provide financing, to persuade the state, as the lender of last resort, to pick up the tab for the construction of Rochdale, which, after some typical Moses-style browbeating, it did. In January 1960, various state agencies loaned the UHF all of the outside funding for the cooperative, $86 million in all. Without the active support of Moses and Rockefeller, the two most powerful people in New York State, Rochdale Village never would have been built.
Moses was proud of what he accomplished in Rochdale Village. He saw the Jamaica site as a prototype, the first of a series of integrated cooperatives to be built in the largely minority areas of the city, a way of furthering urban renewal aims and building new middle-income housing relatively inexpensively and non-controversially. (44) In 1963 Moses described Rochdale Village, in part because of its integrated character, and its potential for improving the quality of life in the surrounding areas of South Jamaica, as "the most significant multi-family cooperative going on the city at this time." He planned bus excursion to Rochdale from the 1964 World's Fair in Flushing Meadows to show it off to the world, and ranked it as one of his greatest achievements, comparable to Jones Beach and Lincoln Center. In 1966 he praised Rochdale as a place that "in a quiet way has achieved remarkable success in integration," and he hailed it, as late as 1968, as "a model for the future." (45) But the ultimate responsibility for creating integration in Rochdale rested upon the people who chose to live there. If they were proud to live in such a community, most were quick to tell you if you asked that they were not civil rights activists. As Harvey Swados reported in 1966 that it would be a mistake to assume that people moved to Rochdale "from conviction, eager to put their liberal, all-men-are-brothers belief to the test." (46) Overwhelmingly, they moved to Rochdale for economic reasons, for the large, inexpensive apartments, and the prospects of good schools and a pleasant community life. For many Blacks, like Lee Reynolds what made Rochdale Village special was simply that it was a housing development that "we had a choice of moving into and not someplace that was left open to Negroes." (47) The Rochdale Village Negro Cultural Society hoped in 1965 that Rochdale, because it was "a voluntarily integrated community it can become an outstanding example of how this American problem of mutual distrust, fear and distortion can be resolved." (48) However, if the bulk of Rochdale's residents were not civil rights activists, they were willing to try integration. According to Harvey Swados, hundreds of white families who expressed initial interest, and many who had already placed down payments, had second thoughts and backed. (49) There were no racial quotas at Rochdale. (50) The UHF would have accepted whatever the final racial percentages turned out to be, and the number of white families who chose to move to Rochdale surprised many on the UHF staff. The UHF, which had not even had to advertise for previous cooperatives--word of mouth sufficed--had an extensive advertising campaign for Rochdale, which included notices in the black press.
If most Rochdale residents were at least open to the idea of integration, there was also a group of activists, committed to civil rights, who moved to Rochdale as well.
Old hands at political organizing and making their opinions heard, they probably played a disproportionate share in sharing the political discourse in the cooperative. In addition, there clearly was a subtle process at work that drew some persons who had been previously largely apolitical or indifferent to civil rights into the excitement of building an integrated community. (52) These groups--the long-time activists, those favorably disposed to civil rights, and largely apolitical persons who wanted the best for their community and families--started to coalesce and shape Rochdale's character as an integrated community even before they moved in. The local schools were notoriously substandard, including two of the very last wooden school houses in New York City. Local blacks leery of the presence of Rochdale were in part placated by the promise that the old decrepit schools would be replaced by new buildings within the cooperative. However, the Board of Education, notoriously skittish in any endeavor involving integrated education, was scandalously slow in building the new schools. By early 1962 it was clear to a group of prospective cooperators that the new schools would not be ready when families started to move in. They formed the Rochdale Village Committee for Public Schools, arguing that only by a thoroughgoing embrace of integration, and working with the local community, could Rochdale Village have quality schools. It was a broadly appealing message, and the committee, typical of the period, was comprised by an ideologically diverse coalition of old leftists, social democrats, and many were people who were essentially apolitical, just deeply alarmed at the lack of the lack of progress in building schools, as well as representatives of PTAs from the surrounding community. The committee's fight was largely successful, and shamed the Board of Education into honoring its commitments, and this formed the basis of other struggles, notably the effort to integrate South Jamaica's intermediate schools.
Integration was central to the vital social and organizational life of Rochdale. By design, UHF cooperatives were intended to foster a sense of community by participation in self-government and the flourishing of an active associative life. Alas, integration in Rochdale Village did not last. Many in Rochdale believed they had created community institutions and links strong enough to withstand the inevitable racial strains and pulls, but they were wrong. By 1969 the exodus of white families was pronounced, and it continued to grow in the years ahead. Black families of course moved out as well, but almost all of the new families coming to Rochdale were African-American. By the late seventies the original 80% white--20% black percentages had been reversed. Not only white families that left Rochdale; black families did as well, and for much of the same reasons, though at a slower pace than whites. But almost all of the new residents in Rochdale were black. By the end of the 1980s the cooperative was 98% non-white, which it remains today. Rochdale, having weathered some hard times, is still a flourishing middle income cooperative, but it is no longer integrated. (61) The reasons for the white exodus from Rochdale were complex. Rochdale was never a racial utopia. Most people, who moved to Rochdale, it bears repeating, were not civil rights activists. In its early history one can find the complaints, both by whites and blacks, typical of the time--white fears of black crime, outsiders, and the problems of integrated education; black anger at curt and rude comments and treatment, and fears that the Jews in Rochdale were "pushy" and were trying to unduly dominate the cooperative's political and cultural affairs. (62) Some projects, notably a proposed community swimming pool in Rochdale, clearly failed because of racial attitudes within the cooperative. (63) Probably the dominant view among Rochdale's residents was that by moving to Rochdale they had done more to advance integration than almost anyone else among New York City's millions, and asking them to do more would be unfair. As one man wrote in 1965, "we came to Rochdale, not as fighters for integration, but as people who have accepted integration as a way of life." (64) One of the paradoxes of Rochdale is that though it was planned during the "era of integration" it opened just as the assumptions that guided that period were beginning to fracture. A new political climate in black communities was emerging even before the first families moved in. In the summer of 1963 the Rochdale Village construction site became one of two foci in the city for demonstrations against discrimination in the building trades unions. At the heated demonstrations, at which hundreds of people were arrested, the protestors called for what they called a "quota" of the work force to be reserved for minorities--the term affirmative action had not yet come into wide usage. This was widely denounced by leading politicians, and left Kazan nonplussed. Many saw the demonstrations as reflecting the goals of Rochdale of creating an integrated community, and many future residents, white and black, participated in the demonstrations, which also helped strengthen the local branches of the NAACP and CORE. The protests also fostered the growth of new organizations such as the Rochdale Movement, an organization with a Black Nationalist orientation that demanded an end to all forms of discrimination against blacks in the Jamaica area. Twice in 1963 Malcolm X addressed the organization, the second time of November 28, 1963 , in what may well have been his penultimate public appearance as a minister of the Nation of Islam. (65) For radicals like Malcolm X integration was at best irrelevant to the quest for black equality. For mainstream liberals too, there was a growing sense of defensiveness at the radical demands, and a frustration that the plans for integration were proving inadequate. By 1965, the figure who perhaps was emblematic of the fight for liberal integration in New York City, the black psychologist Kenneth Clark, could write an elegiac study, Dark Ghetto, which catalogues his growing despair that those in power had the will to shape a genuinely integrated society. (66) Those in a position of influence in Rochdale Village in the late 1960s are unanimous in their conclusion, across the political spectrum, that the bitterly divisive 1968 teacher's strike doomed integration in Rochdale. (68) Before the strike, an integrated group from Rochdale met with Al Shanker, the president of the United Federation of Teachers, begging him to give Rochdale a dispensation from the strike, fearing its potential damage. Shanker, who was on the board of the UHF, predictably refused. (69) The strike, which directly pitted blacks against Jews in ever escalating volleys of rhetorical violence, irreparably destroyed the fabric of the integration in Rochdale. Black parents and some white supporters stayed in the schools around the clock, fearing among other things, bomb threats. Black Panthers reportedly patrolled outside some of the schools. The strike was a brutal polarizer. You either supported the strike or you didn't. There was no middle ground. Jewish liberals often found themselves despised by both sides. After the damage wrought by the 11-week strike had cleared, there was no longer a constituency, or political future, in supporting integration, in Rochdale, or the city at large. The strike lingered as an unhealed wound. (70) The problem was most acute in Rochdale's new intermediate school, which opened in the fall of 1967. From the outset the school seemed to be in a state of disarray, with substantial discipline problems. The strike bitterly divided the faculty, and the weak administration of the school seemed unable to bring the faculty together, or deal with the problems in their hallways, or accomplish much of anything else. By 1969 problems with the school led to the beginning of the white exodus. As whites left the public school system, for the first time black children were bussed in from the surrounding neighborhood. (Previously those from the adjacent neighborhoods, like the children from Rochdale, had been able to walk to school.) This further accelerated the loss of white students. The key to successful integration is quality public schools; without them, any attempt to create stable integrated housing will fail. A liberal, integrated group wrote to the Board of Education in 1970, calling for maintaining the current racial balance in the schools, and arguing that Rochdale's residents were willing to make sacrifices for the sake of integration but, "the one problem they cannot accept is a poor school situation. This above all is what causing many white and middle class families to move out of this community." (71) There were other explanations for the white exodus from Rochdale. Crime was on the rise throughout New York City and was certainly on the rise in and near Rochdale. There was a heroin epidemic in South Jamaica in the late 1960s; the proximity to Kennedy airport and its abundant organized crime networks likely contributed to a rash of car thefts. (72) There was a the deterioration of the physical condition of the cooperative, with a rash of minor, but annoying acts of vandalism and there were protests over increases in carrying charges (the equivalent of rent.). If education provided the primary catalyst to the white exodus, there was no lack of subsidiary reasons. 
